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Peer effects are possibly very important for educational performance but hard to identify. This paper confirms the
existence of peer effects in a learning process with data from an experiment. The experimental approach circumvents
key econometric problems which greatly restrict the analysis of educational peer effects with administrative or survey
data. The experimental setting offers some insight into the mechanisms of peer interaction. The results show that
prospective cooperation has a motivational effect. There is no evidence with respect to an optimal group composition.
The benefit from the pair treatment is largely independent of the characteristics of the partner.
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1  Introduction 
It is a long-standing hypothesis that the performance of a student depends on the behaviour 
and characteristics of his fellow students. The existence and properties of these peer effects 
influence the welfare implications of educational policies which affect the (self-)selection of 
students into different learning groups (Arnott and Rowse, 1987). Therefore, Rothschild and 
White (1995) describe education as a customer-input-technology. However, the identification 
of peer effects in field data is very difficult. Econometricians invest great effort to identify 
quasi-experimental evidence on peer effects from administrative or survey data. The ideal 
data set would observe the same individual at the same time in the same environment but with 
a different peer. Such a data set is not available. Hence, researchers actually face a choice. 
Either they take non-experimental data from surveys or administrations and turn them into 
quasi-experimental evidence as far as possible. Almost all contributions in the literature have 
followed this part. Or they generate data in a real experiment with key characteristics of a real 
world learning process.  
In this paper I take this second path which is complementary to the econometric approach. 
The experiment circumvents four problems which typically restrict the analysis of peer effects 
with field data: 
(i)  Students are not randomly assigned to their peer groups. Parents, schools or 
administrations  decide  where  students  enrol.  Such  a  selection  process 
precludes the identification of a plausible counter-factual result.
1    
                                                 
1   Gould et al. (2005), Hoxby (2000), and Ammermüller and Pischke (2006) for example 
rely on differences in the compositions of individual classes. These authors estimate what 
would happen if a student was in a different class. Hanushek et al. (2003) and McEwan 
(2003) use variation within peer groups over time to identify peer effects. Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner  (2006), Foster  (2006), Zimmerman  (2003)  and Sacerdote  (2001)  investigate   3 
(ii)  Teacher behaviour and other environmental characteristics can change with the 
peer  group  composition.  The  same  teacher  may  teach  the  same  topic  in  a 
different way, if the average ability or the ability distribution changes in a class 
(Meier, 2004)
2.  
(iii)  Measures  for  peer  effects  have  to  be  exogenous.  The  reflection  problem 
(Manski, 1993) could be ignored if an independent, and relevant, measure for 
each student was available. Yet most datasets do not have such a variable. 
(iv)  Even with a satisfactory dataset the mechanisms of peer effects are difficult to 
identify.  Survey  or  administrative  data  largely  provide  a  ‘peer  group 
composition effect’. This effect does not explain how students influence each 
other and what happens if students do not cooperate at all. 
The experiment in this paper covers a learning process. The subjects face a task on which they 
can improve over time. Some subjects can improve with a randomly assigned partner (pair 
treatment), others have to do it alone (single treatment). The assignment to the treatments is 
random as well. Environmental conditions do not change over time and there is no teacher. 
Hence, any difference in final performance between both treatment groups at the end of the 
experiment derives from the differences in the treatment, i.e. the peer effect.  
Beside  this  identification  of  a  peer  effect,  the  experiment  allows  an  insight  into  the 
mechanisms of peer interaction. Firstly, a peer can provide an ‘instructional’ advantage. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
peer effects in universities in a different way. They use the random assignment of students 
into university dormitories as indicators for social tie formation and its subsequent impact on 
educational performance. 
2   Arguably, such an effect is part of a peer effect. One could distinguish between a 
direct peer effect, where students directly influence each other, and an indirect one, where 
students influence each other via the teacher.   4 
subjects explain the task to each other, for example. This instructional argument is a standard 
assumption in models of educational production
3. The advantage typically differs with the 
composition  of  the  peer  group.  High  ability  students  are  assumed  to  provide  a  greater 
advantage, for example. The anticipation of this advantage can provide motivation even if the 
motivational mechanism does not exist
4. Secondly, a partner can motivate even if the learning 
technology of single and pairs do not differ significantly. People do not want to appear as 
being  a  lazy,  for  example.  This  aspect  has  largely  been  ignored  in  the  literature  on  the 
economics of education. Falk and Ichino (2006) find experimental evidence for positive peer 
effects in a “real task”, non-cooperative production environment. In their case the peer effect 
stems from the mere presence of another person in the room.
5 A large psychological literature 
emphasizes the role of peers as benchmark for the development of academic self-concepts. An 
academic self-concept captures the self-assessment of individual capabilities for a specific 
                                                 
3   Lazear (2001) focuses on disadvantage from fellow students via the interruption of 
instruction, but this does not change the logic of the argument. Lazear's approach provides a 
connection between peer group composition and peer group size. In his model educational 
output is maximized if each student is alone with a teacher.  
4   A motivational factor can derive from the fact, that the abilities of the partners are 
complementary inputs. In this case, the marginal gain from investing effort is lower in the 
single treatment groups, where the “partner” has an effective ability of zero. An anonymous 
reviewer  provided  this  helpful  comment.  For  the  motivational  aspect  of  prospective 
educational technology improvements see also the model set-up in De Fraja and Landeras 
(2006) 
5  Falk and Ichino relate their approach to the “social facilitation paradigm”, a research 
topic in the psychological literature (e.g., Zajonc, 1965, Cottrell et al., 1968, or more recently 
Feinberg and Aiello, 2006).     5 
academic  subject
6.  Again,  this  motivational  function  can  vary  with  the  peer  group 
composition.  
Evidence  for  the  second,  purely  motivational  mechanism  is  provided  by  a  pre-treatment 
performance test. The subjects know if they will cooperate or not but cooperation has not yet 
taken place. A second performance test after the treatment provides information about the 
instructional benefit. The performance in the second test, controlled for performance in the 
first test, provides information about the benefit from the actual cooperation. 
The results show a significant peer effect. Subjects with a partner performed better in both 
tests. The results provide evidence for the motivational mechanism since the subjects with a 
prospective  partner  are  already  better  in  the  first  test  than  those  subjects  in  the  single 
treatment  group.  I  also  find  evidence  for  the  instructional  effect  but  this  evidence  is  not 
entirely  robust.  The  results  provide  only  little  evidence  with  respect  to  an  optimal  group 
composition. The benefit from the pair treatment is independent of the characteristics of the 
partner.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  describes  the  experimental  design. 
Section 3 contains the hypotheses and section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the 
results and section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6  Festinger (1954) initiated this literature, and Marsh (1987) captured it as the Big-Fish-
Little-Pond-Effect. A student thinks he is good in, say, math, just because all others are rather 
bad. Köller (2004) provides a summary of this psychological literature.   6 
2  The Experiment 
2.1 Design of the experiment 
The  objective  of  the  experiment  is  to  identify  if  and  how  learning  partners  affect  the 
performance of a subject in a learning process. Two different mechanisms of peer effects are 
investigated:  Firstly,  a  motivational  mechanism  can  exist.  A  partner  induces  a  subject  to 
provide more effort before cooperation takes place. Secondly, partners support (or distract) 
each  other  directly  once  they  cooperate.  This  direct  benefit  is  called  the  instructional 
mechanism. Both mechanisms may depend on the composition of the peer group, i.e. the 
characteristics of the partner. 
The implementation of the peer effect design is rather straightforward (see figure 1). The 
subjects faced a learning process for a specific task. The task was a largely unknown logical 
puzzle  called  Kakurasu  which  will  be  described  in  greater  detail  below.  The  participants 
received some general rules (see appendix) and then faced a first test about the task. The test 
measured how many puzzles the subjects solved in 15 minutes. I use the test to identify 
motivational differences between the treatment groups. 
After the first test, subjects could prepare for 20 minutes for a second test. In this preparation 
period the treatment took place. Some subjects had to prepare alone (single treatment), others 
with a partner (pair treatment). The subjects learned at the beginning of the experiment about 
their treatment and the prospective partner. During the preparation period students got some 
further puzzles on which they could work.  
After  the  preparation  period  the  second  test  started.  Again,  the  test  measured  how  many 
puzzles the subjects solved in 15 minutes. However, the puzzles were more difficult in this 
test. Questionnaires were handed out before and after the experiment.   7 
Figure 1: The design of the experiment 
 
The existence of peer effects is confirmed if the treatment groups differ significantly in the 
performance in the second test. The experiment allows distinguishing between the different 
mechanisms of peer interaction. If the treatment groups differ in the first test, a prospective 
partner induces higher effort, even if he does not provide support. In this case the motivational 
mechanism  works.  If  the  differences  between  treatment  groups  are  significant  even  after 
controlling for individual performance in the first test, we have evidence for benefits from 
actual  cooperation  (the  instructional  mechanism).  The  composition  of  a  learning  group 
matters if the performance of a subject in the pair treatment group increases or decreases with 
some exogenous characteristics of the partner. 
It  is  clear  that  the  motivational  and  the  instructional  mechanisms  interact.  Improved 
prospective marginal productivity from cooperation can induce higher motivation. On the 
other hand, higher marginal productivity from higher motivation can induce a higher benefit 
from  cooperation.  The  latter  implies  that  a  simple  differences-in-differences  estimation  is 
inappropriate for an identification of the instructional mechanism. The former implies that 
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necessarily the only one. The experimental set-up cannot distinguish between these different 
sources.  A  feasible  experimental  set-up  would  not  be  compatible  with  the  professional 
standards on deception in experimental economics (see below).  
 
2.2 The Task 
In the experiment the participants can learn a solution strategy for a logical puzzle called 
Kakurasu (see appendix
7). This type of puzzle consists of a matrix in which the correct fields 
have  to  be  marked.  Numbers  at  each  line  and  column  of  the  matrix  allow  deriving  the 
logically correct solution.  
The task satisfies several criteria. Subjects can learn the logic of the puzzle within reasonable 
time. The puzzle can vary in difficulty by increasing or decreasing the size of the matrix. 
Unlike the famous Sudoku the puzzle is largely unknown. Hence many subjects start from 
zero
8.  
The matrices in the first and second tests are of different size (4x4 and 5x5 respectively). This 
variation is used to avoid floor or ceiling effects in the learning process. The experiment has 
been pre-tested. Here, the matrices were of identical size in both tests, to show if subjects 
actually improve. Using 5x5 matrices for puzzles in the first test caused a floor effect. Only 
few people actually managed to solve a single puzzle. On the other hand, 4x4 matrices for 
puzzles in the second test are too easy to solve. Many participants did not improve from test 1 
to  test  2  (a  ceiling  effect).  In  the  preparation  period,  the  subjects  got  4x4,  5x5  and  6x6 
puzzles. 
                                                 
7   A detailed description of the puzzle can be found at www.janko.at (in German). The 
owners of the website created the meaningless name for the puzzle. 
8   Similar puzzles exist on dedicated homepages on the internet. Hence, it is likely that 
some participants have an advantage even though they do not know the puzzle.   9 
2.3 The Procedure 
The first experiment was conducted on the 5
th of December in 2006 with 85 Swiss students at 
a public high school (Kantonsschule) in Kreuzlingen in the Canton of Thurgau in Switzerland. 
A  second  experiment  took  place  on  26
th  February,  2007  with  61  students  from  a  similar 
school  in  Romanshorn  in  the  same  canton.  The  Canton  groups  students  according  to 
performance into different schools. Both schools roughly capture the top 15% of the students 
in their hometown. 
The  students  were  recruited  from  the  top  three  grades  (age  15-18)  through  the  school’s 
intranet. Students responded via E-Mail and provided information about their grade and sex.  
Each participant got 20 Swiss Francs (about 12.40   or 16.25 US$ in December 2006) for 
their participation. 48 participants were assigned to the single treatment and 96 to the pair 
treatment group. The subjects were assigned randomly to the different groups. Each subject in 
the pair treatment group got a randomly assigned partner, but only from the same class level 
and sex. Due to missing partners at the experiment, three pairs were formed with subjects 
from different grades. Table 1 shows the composition of single treatment and pair treatment 
groups.  
All  subjects  did  the  experiment  at  the  same  time  to  ensure  that  students  could  not 
communicate  solution  hints  to  following  students.  In  Kreuzlingen,  the  subjects  did  the 
experiment in five different rooms in the school. Two rooms were filled with single learners, 
three rooms with the pair treatment group. The differences across rooms within a specific 
treatment group are insignificant. In Romanshorn, the students were separated in two different 
rooms according to their treatment. All the students received their instructions in standardized 
oral and written form from the author of this paper. Each room contained either 20 or 40 
persons. One person per 20 participants was in charge of the technical details (i.e. two persons 
were in each large room). These supervisors received instructions about the procedure of the   10 
experiment but not about the puzzle. The participants were explicitly told that the overseer 
could not answer questions with respect to the puzzle.  
Table 1: The distribution of the subjects into single treatment and pair treatment groups 
  Single treatment group  Pair treatment group 
Grade  Male  Female  Sum  Male  Female  Sum 
2  11  10  21  27  18  45 
3  8  7  15  19  10  29 
4  7  6  13  16  6  22 
Sum  26  23  49  62  34  96 
 
2.4 Discussion of the Design 
The design of the experiment is without precedent in the economic literature. I did not find 
anything similar in other disciplines like  sociology, psychology or education. The closest 
relation is the one provided by Falk and Ichino (2006). These authors just observe peer effects 
in a simple production task with fixed wages. The experiment in this paper covers a learning 
process and distinguishes between different mechanisms of peer effects.  
The random assignment of subjects into different treatment groups ensures that self selection 
does not play a role. All subjects face the same problem. Within the pair treatment the groups 
are  of  identical  size.  While  verbal  interaction  between  partners  was  allowed  during  the 
preparation period, all subjects faced the same conditions during the tests and the analysis is 
based on the results of these tests.  
The results of the experiment are likely to change with the task, the subject pool or the pay-
out formula. The floor and ceiling effects identified in the pre-tests support this presumption. 
A change in the result does not imply that the design is inappropriate. The fixed payment 
keeps  the  set-up  as  simple  as  possible.  If  financial  incentives  were  the  only  source  of   11 
motivation the results in the first test should not differ within and across treatment groups. 
Since students know each other and cooperate face to face in the preparation period, financial 
incentives could induce some of them to promise post-experimental rewards or punishments 
to elicit the desired level of cooperation. Furthermore, the results from Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2000) show that the impact of financial incentives on performance in tasks with a great 
cognitive demand is not trivial. Hence, a much larger experimental setup would be necessary 
which would extend beyond the objectives of this paper. Finally, Deci and Ryan (1985) claim 
that human beings’ “need for competence” is a source of intrinsic motivation equivalent to 
basic needs for autonomy and social relatedness. This assumption implies that subjects with 
different marginal productivity will provide different test results. The experiment allows to 
investigating if it is too simplistic.  
The  experimental  design  identifies  the  instructional  and  the  motivational  benefits  derived 
from  peers.  All  subjects  were  informed  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment  about  their 
treatment and – in the pair treatment – their prospective partner. I use econometric analysis to 
distinguish between the instructional and the motivational mechanism. Using the performance 
in  the  first  test  as  a  control  variable  eliminates  the  motivational  differences  between  the 
treatment groups. Any resulting difference between the treatment groups derives from the 
availability of a cooperation partner. A different way to identify the instructional mechanism 
is also possible: Two treatment groups (single and pairs) in which subjects learn about their 
treatment  only  after  the  first  test.  The  econometric  analysis  provides  a  much  more 
parsimonious identification (in terms of sample size) for a result which is unlikely to differ 
significantly.  
These alternative treatment groups would not add any insight into the sources of motivation. 
The experiment can identify motivational differences between the treatment groups. It cannot 
necessarily distinguish if this motivation derives from having a partner per se (e.g. for reasons 
of social control) or from the anticipation of instructional benefits and the resulting increased   12 
marginal  productivity.  Note  that  the  performance  in  the  first  test  of  subjects  in  this  new 
treatment group is not necessarily the same of those in the single treatment with ex-ante 
information about the treatment. The latter group knows that they will never have a partner in 
the experiment, while the subjects in the former one may correctly anticipate cooperation in 
the preparation period. Strictly speaking, two other treatments would be necessary: One single 
treatment in which students are deceived with the information that they will have a partner in 
the  preparation  period  and  one  pair  treatment  in  which  students  are  deceived  with  the 
information  that  they  will  have  no  partner  in  the  preparation  period.  Such  a  treatment  is 
obviously not compatible with the standards of experimental economics.  
 
3  Behavioral Expectations with Positive Peer Effects 
Figure 2 illustrates the expectations in a stylized way. The lower straight line shows how 
subjects improve over time in the single treatment group. The subjects in the pair treatment 
benefit from cooperation, if peer effects are positive. Therefore, their marginal productivity is 
greater throughout the experiment. In the preparation period the curve is particularly steep 
because here the instructional benefit from cooperation kicks in. Before the preparation period 
(i.e. in Test 1) subjects are motivated by the prospective cooperation. In Test 2 the subjects 
reap the rewards from the cooperation. The dotted line indicates the outcome if motivation is 
not caused by the instructional benefits from cooperation
9.  
                                                 
9   Of  course,  the  instructional  and  the  motivational  mechanism  are  not  necessarily 
mutually exclusive.    13 
Figure 2: The two mechanisms of peer effects and their impact on performance 
 
4  Results 
I  present  OLS  estimations  in  the  subsequent  econometric  analysis.  The  performance  is 
measured  by  counting  the  number  of  solved  puzzles.  Therefore,  Poisson  regressions  or 
negative binomial regressions seem to be plausible alternatives, depending on the dispersion. 
The  analysis  has  been  conducted  with  all  three  methods  and  differences  are  reported 
whenever they appear. A comparison between the results indicates that OLS regressions are 
the most conservative method with respect to significance levels for testing the propositions. 
A first estimation model shows a difference in the first test between the treatment groups 
(Table 2). I estimate output on a treatment dummy for the pair treatment (Model 1 in the 
table). The results show a significant treatment effect even after controlling for heterogeneity   14 
between the groups with respect to sex (0 = female, 1 = male), the school grade (Grade: 2, 3, 
or 4) and a school dummy (all in Model 2).
10 
The prospective cooperation has a positive impact on the subjects. The subjects were asked at 
the beginning of each test to rate on a scale from one to five how difficult they find the 
puzzle. Controlling for this item pushes the p-level to 0.001. Further controls for marks in 
math and general preferences for logical puzzles supported this evidence. These latter results 
are also robust after including further control variables as well as for both male and female 
participants and the different schools.  
Table 2: Estimation of differences between the treatment groups in the first test. 
OLS: N=145, dependent variable: firsttest; coefficients (robust standard error) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Treatment  1.071 (.476)*  1.203* (.477) 
Grade    .014 (.266) 
Sex    .786^ (.445) 
School    .918* (.428) 
Constant  3.408 (.399)  2.576** (.903) 
R   .0361  .0842 
Significance levels: ***=.001,**=.01,*=.05, ^=0.1 
 
However, it is not clear at this point if the motivation is derived from the anticipation of an 
instructional  benefit  or  if  it  is  ‘purely  motivational’  (i.e.  independent  of  prospective 
                                                 
10   No incident of cheating was observed during the test, which could have driven the 
result. The correlation between the first test score of a subject in the pair treatment and the test 
score of his prospective partner is .01, which underlines this observation.   15 
productivity). Therefore the next step in the analysis is the identification of the instructional 
mechanism. A standard differences-in-differences estimation does not clearly distinguish the 
motivational mechanism from the instructional one. Differences in differences between the 
treatment  groups  do  not  just  derive  from  the  instructional  mechanism  but  also  from 
motivational differences in the first period. These differences in the first test can put subjects 
on a different “growth path”
11.  
Hence, the instructional mechanism is identified if subjects in the pair treatment perform 
better in the second test than single learners, even after controlling for performance in the first 
test. The first test as a control variable eliminates the motivational differences in the first test. 
Since  the  conditions  in  both  tests  are  equal  across  treatment  groups,  any  performance 
difference can only derive from the benefits of cooperation instructional mechanism. Figure 2 
provides a graphical illustration for the argument.  
Table 3 shows the results. Model 1 provides the overall peer effect. However, this significant 
effect is driven to some extent by the results in the first test (Model 2). The resulting treatment 
effect is hardly significant on a 10% level. It is insignificant once differences in the group 
composition are accounted for (Model 3). In the model, the performance in the first test has a 
direct impact on the marginal productivity and – via this direct impact – an indirect one on the 
supply of inputs. Hence, the impact of the first test is non-linear. Model 4 finds a significant 
treatment effect once a non-linear impact of the first test (firsttest ) is taken into account
12.  
                                                 
11  This  is  why  the  straight  lines  in  figure  2  are not  parallel.  A  differences-in-differences 
estimation would require a specific assumption, i.e. that motivation provides an initial mark-
up in performance but does not affect marginal productivity otherwise. 
12 The p-value for the treatment effect is .093 if model 4 is estimated with both firsttest and 
firsttest .   16 
Table 3: Estimation of differences between the treatment groups in the second test. 
OLS: N=145, dependent variable: secondtest; coefficients (robust standard error) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Treatment  .946*** (.334)  .441^ (.263)  .427 (.277)  .519^ (.278) 
Firsttest    .472*** (.051)  .468*** (.052)   
Firsttest         .055*** (.006) 
Grade      .155 (.159)  .153 (.154) 
Sex      -.156 (.266)  -.212 (.269) 
School      .266 (.270)  .339 (.261) 
Constant  2.429*** (.265)  .820*** (.222)  .369 (.545)  .892 (.542) 
R   .0508  .4384  .4487  . 4558 
Significance levels: ***=.001,**=.01,*=.05, ^=0.1 
 
 
The final focus is on optimal peer group composition. At first I test for so-called cognitive 
peer effects, i.e. if performance increases in the ability of the partner. The following analysis 
uses data from the 96 subjects in the peer treatment group. I took several cognitive measures. 
The score of the partner in the first test (partnerscore) does not show any significant effect 
(Model 1 in Table 4) even as a nonlinear measure
13. Other independent predictors have been 
taken  from  the  questionnaires,  e.g.  the  partner’s  math  grade  in  school (mathmark)  or  his 
interest in logical puzzles (sudokupeer). Only the partner’s interest in logical puzzle has a 
small significant effect (Model 2) but it vanishes once it is controlled for the school mark (p-
value: .100). No differences across the different subgroups are observable. There is some 
evidence for cognitive peer effects in the first test score via the math grade of the partner. 
                                                 
13 Even if it was significant, it would be affected by Manski’s (1993) reflection problem.   17 
These effects are small and insignificant for the final performance. The final questionnaire 
included questions about the quality of cooperation, how subjects liked their partner, if they 
were in the same class etc. None of these variables has a significant impact. 
Table 4: Estimation of the cognitive peer effect 
OLS: N=96, dependent variable: secondtest; coefficients (robust standard error) 
Partnerscore  .085   (.062)     
Sudokupeer    .845 (.445)^  .775 (.466)^ 
Mathpeer      .019 (.020) 
Firsttest  .477 (.070)***  .494 (.071)***  .505 (.074)*** 
Grade  .363 (.208)^  .392 (.205)^  .397 (.204)^ 
Sex  -.214 (.329)  -.086 (.339)  -.150 (.347) 
School  -.065 (.355)  -.097 (.357)  -.090 (.360) 
Constant  -.045 (.648)  -.526 (.761)  -.806 (1.151) 
R   .4060  .4223  .4273 
Significance levels: ***=.001,**=.01,*=.05, ^=0.1 
 
Hence, there is no evidence for cognitive peer effects. In fact, the experiment does not allow 
any conclusion about the dominance of any particular group composition policy. 
 
5  Summary and Discussion 
This  paper  confirmed  the  existence  of  peer  effects  in  a  learning  context  with  a  field 
experiment  and  allowed  some  insight  into  the  mechanisms  of  peer  interaction.  The 
experimental  approach  circumvents  key  econometric  problems  which  greatly  restrict  the 
analysis  of  peer  interaction  with  administrative  or  survey  data.  The  results  show  that   18 
prospective cooperation has a motivational effect. The additional “instructional” benefit from 
actual cooperation is not significant across all specifications. Furthermore, the benefit from 
cooperation is independent of the characteristics of the partner.  
A simple variation of the experiment may change this outcome. The actual treatment starts 25 
minutes after the experiment has begun. Reducing this time decreases the performance in the 
first test and enhances the relative importance of the treatment period for the success in the 
second test. Increasing the complexity of the task (e.g. by changing the puzzles in the first test 
to a 5x5 matrix) can have a similar effect because it takes longer to “digest” the logic behind 
the puzzle. Evidence from the different schools supports this consideration. The students in 
one school perform worse in the first test than their colleagues in the other one, i.e. the task is, 
on average, more difficult for them
14. Estimating the third model in Table 4 separately for 
each school documents a significant treatment effect in the school with the lower performance 
(p-value = .033) and an insignificant one in the better school. Variations in the timing may 
also provide some evidence about the optimal composition of learning groups. 
The experiment identified a motivational mechanism for peer effects which is independent of 
the marginal productivity. This result does not question the assumption that utility increases in 
final  performance.  It  indicates  that  the  utility  function  is  more  complex  than  the  model 
assumes. Adjusting pay to performance might attach more weight to the final performance 
measure and provide stronger evidence for the instructional mechanism. However, as stated 
above, such an identification strategy is not trivial and would require a much more complex 
experimental set-up.  
An almost unlimited amount of possible further experimental variations exist and some of 
these  variations  can  have  an  impact  on  the  results.  This  is  a  phenomenon  which  is  not 
                                                 
14   The p-value in a two-sample t test is .0438. See also Table 2.   19 
unknown in the econometric literature on peer effects
15. It is a nice feature of the experimental 
approach that future research allows to generate data which provide precise information about 
the impact of any variation. 
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Appendix A: Introductory letter 
The participants in the different treatment groups received different introductory letters. The 
appendix merges both letters. The participants did not know anything about the treatment in 




You take part in an research project about the learning of logical puzzles. The experiment will 
go on for about one hour. Thank you very much for your participation. 
 
We will test you twice in the experiment, at the beginning and at the end. In both tests we 
investigate, how many puzzles you can solve within a specific time. 
 
Instruction for single treatment group: 
 
   22 
Please work alone during the entire experiment. 
 
Please solve these tests alone. 
Please put your solution for each puzzle in the solution sheet only. 
 
Between both tests you have twenty minutes to learn more about the logic of the puzzle. You 








Between both tests you have twenty minutes to learn more about the logic of the puzzle. You 
get  a  sheet  with  more  puzzles  to  do  so.  In  this  period  you  can  cooperate  with  another 
participant. The seat number of your partner is on the sheet with your own number. 
 
Instruction for both groups: 
We ask you to answer two questionnaires, one at the beginning and one at the end of the 
experiment. We ensure the anonymity of the results. You will get 20 Francs once you hand in 
the last questionnaire at the end. 
You will find the rules for the puzzle on the next sheet. Please read them carefully. We cannot 
answer any questions in order to keep the conditions identical for all participants. Please do 
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Your task in the test: Solve as many puzzles as possible by 
marking the correct boxes in the puzzle. 
 
Appendix B: Rules (Translated from German) 
 
 
The composition of a puzzle: 









The  puzzle  is  surrounded  by  numbers.  These  are  very  important.  The  numbers  at  right 





  5  6  1  2   
3          1 
7          2 
1          3 
2          4 
  1  2  3  4   
Please bear in mind: 
Each box has two different values!   24 
1. At the right boundary you find the values for each box in the respective row. 
  5  6  1  2     
3  1  1  1  1  1  All boxes in row one have value 1. 
7  2  2  2  2  2  All boxes in row two have value 2. 
1  3  3  3  3  3  All boxes in row three have value 3. 
2  4  4  4  4  4  All boxes in row four have value 4. 
  1  2  3  4     
 
2. At the lower boundary you find the values for each box in the respective column. 
    5  6  1  2     
  3  1  2  3  4  1   
  7  1  2  3  4  2   
  1  1  2  3  4  3   
  2  1  2  3  4  4   
    1  2  3  4     
All boxes in the first column have value 1 
All boxes in the second column have value 2 
All boxes in the third column have value 3 
All boxes in the fourth column have value 4 
   25 
 














3. The numbers at the left boundary show the sum of the values of all marked boxes in 
the respective row.  
In this case, the values at the lower boundary are the relevant values. 
    5  6  1  2   
The sum in row one is 3  3          1 
The sum in row two is 7  7          2 
The sum in row three is 1  1          3 
The sum in row four is 2  2          4 
    1  2  3  4   
 
  5  6  1  2   
3  1 / 1  1 / 2  1 / 3  1 / 4  1 
7  2 / 1  2 / 2  2 / 3  2 / 4  2 
1  3 / 1  3 / 2  3 / 3  3 / 4  3 
2  4 / 1  4 / 2  4 / 3  4 / 4  4 
  1  2  3  4   
All boxes in the first column have value 1. 
All boxes in the second column have value 2. 
All boxes in the third column have value 3 
All boxes in the fourth column have value 4. 
 
All boxes in row one have value 1. 
All boxes in row two have value 2. 
All boxes in row three have value 3 
All boxes in row four have value 4. 
. 
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Now you have to mark the boxes, ensuring that both the values on 
the top and at the left boundary are correct. 
4. The numbers at the top boundary show the sum of the values of all marked boxes in 
the respective column. 
In this case, the values at the right boundary are the relevant values. 
 
The sum in column one is 5 
The sum in column two is 5 
The sum in column three is 1 
The sum in column four is 2 
    5  6  1  2     
  3          1   
  7          2   
  1          3   
  2          4   
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Our example has the following solution 
 
  5  6  1  2   
3      X    1 
7  X  X    X  2 
1  X        3 
2    X      4 
  1  2  3  4   
Is the solution correct? 
In row one, the sum of all marked boxes has to be 3. Only the third box is marked, its value is 
3 (see lower boundary). Hence, the solution in this row is correct. 
In column one, the sum of all marked boxes has to be 5. The second and the third box are 
marked: 2+3=5 (see right boundary). The solution in this column is correct. 
 
Indeed, the marked boxes ensure a correct solution for the values on the top and the left. 
Row one:   3 = 3 
Row two:  7 = 1+2+4 
Row three:  1 = 1 
Row four:   2 = 2 
 
Column one:  5 = 2+3 
Column two:  6 = 2+4 
Column three: 1 = 1 




If you do not understand the solution at the moment, it is no problem. Go through the solution 
once. Or maybe the following test can help you. Good luck.
For  the  sums  in  each  row,  take  the 
marked  boxes  in  this  row  with  the 
corresponding values at the bottom. 
For the sums in each column, take the 
marked boxes in this column with the 
corresponding values at the right. 28 
 
Appendix C: The Questionnaires (translations from German) 
Questions in the first questionnaire: 
•  Sex (Boxes: male and female) 
•  How old are you?  
•  What are your preferred subjects in school? Note up to three 
•  What are your three best subjects in school? 
•  What was your math mark in last year’s final certificate? 
•  What was your overall average mark in last year’s final certificate? 
•  Do you like to go to school? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Do you often prepare for exams with other students? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Can  you  explain  difficult  topics  successfully  to  others  (e.g.  solution  for  difficult 
mathematical tasks)? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Do you get along with most of your fellow students? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Do you like to solve logical puzzles, e.g. Sudoku? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Are you member in a club? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  If yes, what type of club is it? 
 
Questions ahead of each test 
•  Do you understand the rules of the puzzle? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  What do you expect? Will you solve the puzzles easily or with difficulty? (5 Boxes, 
very easy to very difficult)  
•  Will your performance in this test be above or below the average performance of the 
other participants? (5 Boxes, much below average to much above average) 
 29 
 
Questions in the final questionnaire: 
•  Compared with your expectations, did you find the puzzles easier or more difficult to 
solve. (5 Boxes, much easier to much more difficult)  
•  Do you expect to perform better than the average? (5 Boxes, much worse to much 
better)  
•  How was the quality of cooperation with the partner? (5 Boxes, very good  to very 
bad)  
•  Was your partner helpful during the preparation? (5 Boxes, very helpful  to not helpful 
at all)  
•  Did you know your partner before the experiment? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Are you in the same grade? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Are you in the same class? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Does your partner live in your vicinity? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Do you prepare occasionally with him for classes or exams? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  How much do you like your partner ? (5 Boxes, very much to not at all)  
•  Did you like the experiment?  (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Are you interested in the results of the experiment? (Boxes: yes and no) 
•  Do you want to participate in similar experiments in the future? (Boxes: yes and no) 
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